In May 2023, employees at Perry Johnson & Associates (PJ&A), a company that handled medical transcription, coding, and billing for healthcare organizations, were contacted by the people who had been inside their network for weeks. That’s how they found out about the breach.
Their monitoring software had seen it. It logged the intruders’ activity starting around March 29. However, nobody got an alert, because the software had never been set up to send any. But a system administrator had asked for email alerts more than a year earlier.
On November 6, the attorneys general of New York, Connecticut, Michigan, and New Jersey announced a settlement of up to $10 million over the breach, which exposed records tied to more than 13.3 million people. The settlement text lists the security controls the Perry Johnson companies must now maintain. It reads like a written answer to the question “what counts as reasonable security?”
A few things to know before you treat it as a to-do list. The terms bind only the Perry Johnson companies, and they neither admit nor deny the findings. Only $300,000 is due up front. The other $9.7 million is suspended and comes due if they break the terms or their financial statements prove inaccurate. Four of the five companies are insolvent and inactive. Still, four state regulators put their names on a list of what they consider reasonable security.
How the Attackers Got In
According to the settlement, the attackers logged in remotely through a web application using the credentials of one employee at a coding company. Unfortunately, remote access didn’t require multi-factor authentication. Over the next month, they mapped the network, harvested passwords, escalated their privileges, and moved from system to system. They copied unencrypted database files, including backups. The files held names, Social Security numbers, diagnoses, medications, and lab results.
Investigators never found out how the attackers got that first login. They did find that the account was one of nine created on the same day with nearly identical passwords, all sent to several managers in a single email. The worst part is that ten months later, none of those passwords had been changed.
If one employee’s remote login were stolen at your company, how far could someone get, and would anyone notice? That’s a question an internal penetration test is built to answer. Let’s talk about what that would look like for your environment.
The Reasonable Security Checklist
Here’s what any active Perry Johnson company must now maintain, with paragraph numbers from the settlement text so you can review it yourself, if you want.
- MFA on every account and every remote login (paragraph 43): This covers all user accounts, including administrators, plus all remote access to the network. It’s the most direct fix for how this breach started.
- An annual HIPAA risk assessment (47): The findings say PJ&A had done general risk assessments but never a HIPAA risk analysis. The settlement requires one every year, consistent with HIPAA, with the results documented.
- Annual penetration testing (48): A testing program designed to find, assess, and fix security vulnerabilities, run at least once a year, with the results documented. Yes, we’re biased, but this is the paragraph we’d circle. The results must also be available to the outside assessor in the next item, so the two feed each other.
- An outside assessment (58): Within 90 days of becoming active, each company must get a comprehensive review of its network security from an independent third party, then again every year for three years. The assessor must be a qualified person (a CISSP, CISA, or similar) with at least five years of experience, and the reports must go to the New York Attorney General within two weeks.
- Segmentation (49): Separate partitions for systems that hold patient data, with clear boundaries and communication allowed only where the business needs it.
- Monitoring that tells someone (51): Centralized logging, plus automated alerts that reach security staff when something looks wrong. The settlement also calls for endpoint detection and response, intrusion detection and prevention, and data loss prevention. Given that PJ&A’s software saw the attack and told no one, it’s no surprise the alerting requirement made the list.
- Encryption, access limits, and passwords (45, 41, 44): Encrypt patient data. Give people access only to what their jobs require, remove it promptly when they leave, ban shared accounts, and audit access twice a year. No default, shared, or generic passwords.
- Knowing what you have and who’s in charge (46, 56, 39): An inventory of every asset that holds sensitive data, a written incident response plan, and a named security lead who reports to the CEO and the board at least twice a year.
What a Penetration Test Could Have Asked
Several items on that list can be checked by a penetration test. For a vendor like PJ&A, a scoped test could have asked the questions the attackers ended up answering for real. Does every way in require MFA, including remote access? If one employee’s login is stolen, how far can someone get? And does anyone get an alert when they try?
A policy says what a company intends to do. A test shows what happens when someone tries.
If You Work With Healthcare Entities
If you run a billing, coding, transcription, or IT company that handles patient data, treat this list as a reasonable guess at what regulators will look for after an incident.
If you’re a practice that hires those vendors, you can ask them the same questions. Is MFA required on all remote access? When was your last penetration test, and can I see a summary? Who reviews your alerts? Your business associate agreement is a natural place to start that conversation.
And if you’re ready for a penetration test, we’re glad to talk through what a scoped penetration test would cover for your environment. MainNerve has been doing this work for over 20 years. Contact us today for a free consultation.